Analysis on Corruption and Collusive Behaviors in Government Procurement in a Game Theory Perspective

Xiaoyan Hao, Peixiao Qi

Abstract


Government Procurement is an important measure by which the government can guide economic development direction, protect and support national (or local) industry and implement macro-economic control. This paper analyzes corruption and collusive behaviors in government procurement practice in a Game Theory perspective. First, using Willenbrock’s bidding model to analyze the rent-seeking behavior in government procurement. Second, using game model to analyze procurement officials’ corruption and collusive behavior. Third, using game model to analyze suppliers’ collusive behavior. Finally, this paper proposes some corresponding solutions in each part based on game model analysis.

Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5430/jms.v2n2p38

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

Journal of Management and Strategy
ISSN 1923-3965 (Print)   ISSN 1923-3973 (Online)

 

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