Power of a Deposit Insurance Scheme’s Authority and a Banking Crisis

Anichul Hoque Khan, Kazi Nazrul Islam

Abstract


Using a large panel data set, this study analyzes effects of empowering the authority of an explicit deposit insurance scheme (EDIS) on banking crises. Findings suggest that the use of an EDIS increases the probability of a banking crisis. Moreover, this probability is greater if the EDIS is not empowered for the direct intervention in banks’ operations—e.g., the power to cancel or revoke banks’ deposit insurance contracts, or situations in which deposits are not explicitly covered before a bank failure but are to be covered after the failure. The probability is even greater if the EDIS is used in a less developed country while the scheme is not empowered for the direct intervention in bank operations or uncovered deposits are to be covered ex post to a bank failure.


Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5430/jbar.v1n2p88

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Journal of Business Administration Research

ISSN 1927-9507 (Print)      ISSN 1927-9515  (Online)

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