Nash Equilibria on Soft Information Control Games--Based on Banking Industry in China

Fei Xu, Yong Jiang

Abstract


In the competition of banking sector in China, to maximize the amount of soft information control is an important goal. In an n-dimensional Euclidean space, there exists Nash equilibrium for two different banks in the competition of soft information control. Keeping the same competitive strategy is the best response to each other's actions of the two banks. Further analysis is based on the incomplete information dynamic game between various branches of the same bank. The Nash equilibrium solution for the first mover is to design strategy based on market information, while the followers’ optimal strategy is to imitate the first mover’s policy, whatever knowledge that they may obtain.

Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5430/ijfr.v4n1p84

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

International Journal of Financial Research
ISSN 1923-4023(Print) ISSN 1923-4031(Online)

 

Copyright © Sciedu Press

To make sure that you can receive messages from us, please add the 'Sciedu.ca' domain to your e-mail 'safe list'. If you do not receive e-mail in your 'inbox', check your 'bulk mail' or 'junk mail' folders.