Correlations between Executive Pay, Equity Incentive and Corporate Performance: Empirical Analysis Based on Panel Data of China’s Listed Companies

Huiguan Ding, Jiansheng Cai, Yanxia Niu

Abstract


The global recession triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis in 2009 has aroused reflections over executive pay system. Domestic and foreign theorists have not yet reached a unanimous conclusion in their research on relationship between executive compensation incentives and corporate performance, especially correlations between executive pay and executive shareholding ratio and equity concentration degree. There also exist large differences in the empirical results. This paper, on the basis of reviewing the previous research results, takes component stocks of Shanghai 180 and Shenzhen 100 indices during 2007-2009 as samples and tests the correlations between executive pay, equity incentive and corporate performance of China’s listed companies through multiple regression analysis, which is of great significance to direct the practices in executive compensation system reform of China.

Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5430/ijfr.v3n3p24

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

International Journal of Financial Research
ISSN 1923-4023(Print) ISSN 1923-4031(Online)

 

Copyright © Sciedu Press

To make sure that you can receive messages from us, please add the 'Sciedu.ca' domain to your e-mail 'safe list'. If you do not receive e-mail in your 'inbox', check your 'bulk mail' or 'junk mail' folders.