Does CEOs Performance-based Compensation Waits on Shareholders? A Cross National Analysis

Habib Jouber, Hamadi Fakhfakh

Abstract


The objective of the paper is to develop deeper insight into how the firm’s incentive systems are designed and, whether the CEOs compensation pay-to-performance schemes really align the incentives of executives and shareholders. Logit and Stepwise regressions on executive compensation data of 231 listed companies’ belongings to four countries from the Anglo-American and the Euro-continental corporate governance models over the period 2004-2008 show that pay-to-performance incentives serve likely shareholders as they tend to create value. Moreover, sensitivity analyses point out that their effects on the Long Term Total Shareholder Return (LTTRS) are far from unanimous. They often depend on the context in which they are planned and executed. More specifically, they are even large than the property rights are stripped, the institutional ownership is less restricted, the governance quality is better, the investor protection is high, and the legal system is common law one. 

Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5430/ijba.v2n3p68

Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License.

International Journal of Business Administration
ISSN 1923-4007(Print) ISSN 1923-4015(Online)

 

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