Managerial Incentives and Audit Fees: Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry

James Ross Booth, Lena Chua Booth, Daniel Deli

Abstract


We examine the relation between audit fees and managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry. Using proxies for managerial incentives based on fund organizational form, advisor compensation, and fund expenses, we find that audit fees are higher when managerial incentives are poor. Our results represent new evidence on the relation between audit fees and managerial incentives.


Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5430/afr.v1n1p76

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Accounting and Finance Research
ISSN 1927-5986 (Print)   ISSN 1927-5994 (Online)

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