Earnings Management and Auditor Quality

Savita Sahay, Harry ZviDavis, Meyer Peikes

Abstract


This paper analyzes the relationship between a firm’s demand for different quality auditors and opportunities for earnings management.In our model, the firm simultaneously chooses the bias it introduces into its pre-audited earnings and the quality of its auditor. We show that firms that choose a highlevel of bias also choose a low-quality auditor, even though the market-maker makes a correction for the level of residual bias in audited reports. Firms that choose a low level of bias choose a high-quality auditor.We also study the effect of changes in the regulatory environment on the market equilibrium.Our analysis shows that stricter regulation leads to more firms choosing low-quality auditors, thus it is not in the interest of high quality auditors to support such measures.


Full Text: PDF DOI: 10.5430/afr.v1n1p38

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Accounting and Finance Research
ISSN 1927-5986 (Print)   ISSN 1927-5994 (Online)

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